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Abstract This chapter offers an overview of the philosophy of Robert S. Sokolowski 
with a focus on his account of what philosophy is, how philosophy arises out of pre- 
philosophical life, and how it is related back to pre-philosophical life. It also situates 
Sokolowsk’s achievements in articulating the relationship between Husserlian phe-
nomenology and modern and pre-modern styles of philosophizing.
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It dawned on me rather abruptly … that when we think we directly articulate the world and 
the things in it, that we do not rearrange and combine sense data or ideas or concepts. 
Things and the world are present to us and we articulate their presences. There we are, the 
world and us, with nothing in between. This, the fact that thinking is outside and public 
from the start, was the point of Husserl’s teaching on intentionality… . This direct involve-
ment of ourselves in the world was also the point of Husserl’s transcendental reduction. The 
purpose of the reduction is not to encapsulate ourselves in ourselves, but to come to see 
ourselves and the world in correlation. We in our reason are the articulators of the world, 
and the world presents itself to our articulation, and philosophy is the contemplation of how 
this happens, the description of “the world in its human involvement”, to use one of 
[Francis] Slade’s expressions.
Robert Sokolowski, “Husserl as Tutor in Philosophy”1
Robert S. Sokolowski began as an interpreter of Husserl to North American audi-
ences and justly gained the reputation for his care and clarity in this role. After 
sketching Sokolowski’s career, development, and major works, this essay recapitu-
lates one of his most important contributions to phenomenology. Namely, he 
articulates, in a way appropriate to our historical situation, what philosophy is and 
how phenomenological philosophy allows us, in our place and time, to recover in a 
new way the perennial activity of philosophizing.
1 Sokolowski, Robert. 1988. “Husserl as Tutor in Philosophy”. Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology 19, no. 3:296.
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Sokolowski (1934–) is currently Elizabeth Breckenridge Caldwell Professor of 
Philosophy at The Catholic University of America. He completed his Ph.D. at The 
Catholic University of Louvain in 1963 after earning a B.A. and M.A. in philosophy 
at The Catholic University of America and an S.T.B in theology at The Catholic 
University of Louvain. He began teaching at The Catholic University of America in 
1963 and has also served in a visiting capacity at The New School for Social 
Research (1969–1970), The University of Texas at Austin (1978), Villanova 
University (1983), and Yale University (1992). Originally from New Britain, 
Connecticut, he is a Roman Catholic priest in the Archdiocese of Hartford and was 
named monsignor in 1993. He served as an auxiliary chaplain at Bolling Air Force 
Base in Washington, D.C., for nearly 20 years (1976–1995). For eight (1981–1989) 
he served as a consultant at Los Alamos National Laboratory, where he gave the 
J. Robert Oppenheimer Lecture in 1996.
Before a sketch of Sokolowski’s scholarly contributions, it is worth remarking on 
his teaching, given that the breadth of his influence on North American philosophy 
has come not only through his publications, but also through the significant number 
of students who have been fortunate enough to encounter him in the classroom. 
Because he has taught mostly graduate students in philosophy and also in theology, 
many have become professors or priests who have then gone on to influence others. 
He is known in the classroom for a clarity and carefulness with details. His deep 
voice, his dry and smart sense of humor, and his pictures on the board displaying 
fine distinctions in intentionality mark his pedagogy at a surface level, but also, 
more deeply, he is attentive to the way in which people come to learn. He takes 
teaching seriously as a service to his students and to the common good. His class-
room presence and presentation of material—the way he leads his students in 
thought—evidence his patience, gentility, and generosity. For example, in his 
courses, he provides students with his chapter-by-chapter notes and commentary on 
the classic texts he is teaching, notes which are often collected by and shared among 
his students.
As a specialist in Husserlian phenomenology, he has frequently taught courses 
focused on Husserl’s Transcendental and Formal Logic (which, he has commented, 
is Husserl’s best work and too often overlooked), Cartesian Meditations, and The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Other regular 
courses of his include ones focused on Aristotle’s Politics and on Hobbes’ Leviathan 
(two books he has said are especially illuminating when juxtaposed), Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, Virtue and Human Action, and Functions of Philosophy in Theology. 
Teaching is partly done through the content of one’s articulations, but it is done also 
by example, by the attitude one displays toward one’s topics. Gratefully, one often 
discovers in Sokolowski’s students virtues he displayed to them in the classroom, 
for example, a calm toward large questions, an attentiveness to the categorialities 
that structure our lives, a skill at minding and reminding others of important distinc-
tions, and an appreciation for the marvelous way that human reason apprehends 
reality, however imperfectly.
His phenomenology covers a broad array of topics: syntax, predication, and cat-




virtues; artificial intelligence; philosophy of mathematics (with Gian-Carlo Rota); 
metaphysics; the categoriality of human practical life; philosophy of language; 
judgments, propositions, and philosophy of logic; time; political philosophy; the 
human soul and spirit; the visual arts; and Aristotle’s metaphysics, ethics, and logic. 
He has authored eleven books in phenomenology, more than one hundred scholarly 
articles, and many insightful book reviews on wide-ranging topics and thinkers 
from the history of philosophy. Several conferences, a lecture series, and two edited 
volumes have been dedicated to examining his work.2
1  Overview of Sokolowski’s Major Works
Robert Sokolowski’s first two books, The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of 
Constitution (1964) and Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things (1974), 
illustrate why he has been so valuable to English-speaking audiences seeking to 
understand Husserlian phenomenology, but the change from the first to the second 
also indicates the trajectory he was subsequently to take. While The Formation of 
Husserl’s Concept of Constitution is a scrupulous step-wise tracing of what its title 
names, Husserlian Meditations shows Sokolowski’s own philosophical genius more 
clearly. In Husserlian Meditations, Sokolowski repackages Husserl dynamically—
developing especially three themes of Husserl’s, parts and whole, identity in mani-
folds, and empty and filled intentions—allowing readers to appreciate the 
significance of the philosophical basics of Husserl’s work in a way that may be lost 
when navigating either Husserl’s own writings or Sokolowski’s workmanlike treat-
ment of Husserl’s development in The Formation.
Husserlian Meditations concludes with a discussion of philosophy’s service to 
prephilosophical life as “warding off confusion and sophistry” and with an articula-
tion of one of philosophy’s own particular joys: “philosophy as phenomenology 
enjoys the disclosure of things. It delights in all things that are delightful, but enjoys 
them specifically in their being manifest. It further appreciates the human process of 
being truthful, which allows things to be recognized for what they are”.3 One of 
Sokolowski’s influences on readers and students has been this ethic of philosophy 
in its phenomenological mode: it is one particularly wonderful way in which human 
beings exercise their truthfulness, a way in which we admire the display of beings 
and respect human persons in their apprehensions of the world.
A significant jump occurs in the development of Sokolowski’s phenomenology 
in his third book, Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Being 
2 The two edited volumes are The Truthful and the Good: Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski, 
edited by John J. Drummond and James G. Hart (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), and 
Ethics and Theological Disclosures: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski, edited by Guy Mansini 
and James G. Hart (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003).
3 Sokolowski, Robert. 1974. Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 270.
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and Language (1978). In a run, when one is just getting started, the first mile or two 
give way (for the author, in the third mile) to a feeling of being at home with oneself 
in the free, easily coordinated movement of limbs and lungs, bringing with it clear-
ness of mind as a gift. One gets the sense, in reading his first few books, that 
Sokolowski’s third book is his third mile. In Presence and Absence, he seems to 
move more as himself. If seeking to understand Husserl with Sokolowski’s guid-
ance, Husserlian Meditations is the more helpful book. If seeking to understand 
what else we can do with Husserl’s accomplishments, Presence and Absence might 
be preferred.
Presence and Absence begins as an exploration of the basic elements of lan-
guage, the name and the verb, and articulates how language opens us up to the 
world. When doing phenomenological analyses, Sokolowski dependably draws out 
their broader human significance. For example, in the process of learning to name, 
the child recognizes that the object remains what it is when out of touch and sight, 
that it transcends both its presence and its absence. This is not merely a cognitive 
achievement, but also an emotional development: “The importance of consistent 
delay and gratification for a child lies in getting him used to mastering succession, 
to tolerating separation without panic, and in engendering confidence that what he 
desires will come back”.4 This is a maturation of the person’s emotions and a growth 
of the person’s sense of self, for “The sufferer must come to realize that he is not 
identified with his affliction and that he will be released from it”5—and of course, 
this is true not of children only. This is done in a special way through the power of 
naming, for when a person makes “a desirable or distressing thing” nameable, “its 
affective spell is broken”.6 The absence of worldly things, an absence that reality’s 
objectivity affords and that is made possible for us by language, protects both the 
world’s integrity and our own. A parallel process occurs as the person develops the 
ability to distinguish facts and propositions, to suspend the truth of a claim while 
still considering it: “The emergence of the proposition allows us to take a distance 
to our own convictions”.7 The fuller importance that Sokolowski articulates of this 
development of the proposition will be discussed further below.
In Presence and Absence, Sokolowski also elaborates upon Husserl’s claim in 
the Logical Investigations that words are indication signs of thought.8 “Words, and 
the sentence as a whole, can be understood as signals”.9 Namely, “they signal that 
the speaker achieves the syntax, if he speaks thoughtfully, and they simultaneously 
signal to the hearer to perform the propositional move himself. The one grammati-
cal achievement signals in both directions”.10 When the person becomes aware of 
4 Sokolowski, Robert. 1978. Presence and Absence: A Philosophical Investigation of Language 










words as signaling in these ways, he can then be more attentive to what he intimates 
to others (in a way that opens up the possibility of rhetoric, for example) and can be 
more awake to others as responsible for their claims: “The loss of naivety in a 
 critical listener is his becoming aware of the signal as signal, and this is the inhibi-
tion of assent which we have called the propositional turn”.11
Following Presence and Absence, Sokolowski embarked upon more phenome-
nological work that, while obviously indebted to Husserl, illustrates Sokolowski’s 
original phenomenological style. Marking the difference from The Formation 
(1964), on the one hand, to Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study (1985) and 
Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions (1992), on the other, we see that Sokolowski 
has moved from explaining Husserlian phenomenology to appropriating it for his 
own philosophical purposes.
Moral Action is dedicated to describing practical intentionality and especially 
the “categorialities that make up phronêsis”, prudence or practical wisdom.12 It 
begins by developing the distinction between the voluntary and the chosen, phe-
nomenologically recapitulating and elaborating upon Aristotle’s treatment of the 
structure of human action in Nicomachean Ethics III. Sokolowski emphasizes that 
moral action is, by way of a categorial form, identified with and founded on more 
basic actions, which serve as their material substrates. Here he employs Husserl’s 
discovery of intentionality and of categorial objects, which he explains is a discov-
ery that may seem small. Its importance is hard to see, he says: “because it is a 
beginning, it occurs in a setting in which everything else remains the same as it was 
before the discovery was made”.13 He also adapts Heidegger’s ontological differ-
ence, our awareness of a being and its showing up, into a moral ontological differ-
ence: while the good appears to us, so does its seeming as good, and this 
phenomenological gap provides the space in which moral action arises. Putting 
these together with Aristotle’s discussions of the structure of human action, of 
friendship, and of the relation between matter and form, Sokolowski describes how 
in moral action we publically inform a substrate action—e.g., giving a gift, striking 
someone—with a complex interpersonal form by acting in the light of our recogni-
tion of the action as good for me in being good or bad for the other person. The 
analysis defends the integrity of human action as publically and intrinsically mean-
ingful, as reducible neither to some internal intention or act of will nor to its results 
or consequences.
Phenomenology of the Human Person (2008) is in some respects a reworking and 
elaboration of themes developed in Presence and Absence. Here Sokolowski syn-
thesizes many issues from metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophical 
anthropology, engaging contemporary linguistics, psychology, literature, and phi-
losophy as well as classic texts from all eras of the history of philosophy. His goal 
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marked in all his human activities by veracity, an erotic rationality directed toward 
truth (even our irrationalities evidence our rationality, as all perversions can be 
understood only as distortions of well-ordered desire). Recapitulating the classical 
tradition and extending our understanding of rationality, Sokolowski shows how 
reason suffuses our shared human life, from mundane conversations about, e.g., sick 
trees to practical and moral action to the attempt to understand the whole and our 
place in it. In doing so, Sokolowski defends the integrity and responsibility of the 
person as agent and dative of truth and defends the integrity and givenness of reality 
as affording, and worthy of, our rational engagement.
This—veracity and the integrity of the human person—is the unifying theme of 
his oeuvre. In Husserlian phenomenology, he comments, “the human being, as 
thinker and agent, is also validated in its own integrity, with the absences and vague-
nesses and ambiguities that are proper to it”.14 And this defense of the person is, 
correlatively, a defense of the reality to which the person is related: “The validity of 
things and the truth of human being are mutually related. One cannot philosophi-
cally acknowledge our human being unless one also acknowledges the things that 
we are involved with”.15
One important theme of Phenomenology of the Human Person is the interplay of 
a phenomenon’s incidentals, properties, and essence as they emerge naturally in the 
prephilosophical human conversation. Although essences are not popular in modern 
or contemporary philosophy, Sokolowski shows how they need not be dismissed as 
occult entities, postulates of a philosophical reason; for, they show up phenomeno-
logically if we allow philosophy to focus its attention on the human world, and not 
on discovering some hidden realm beneath or beyond the one with which we, as 
relational beings, are entwined. In normal human life, some speakers display them-
selves as deeply knowledgeable about a topic, distinguishing what is crucial or cen-
tral to the phenomenon and responsible for other, more capricious features; likewise, 
other speakers betray themselves as seeing many features but as unable to distin-
guish the passing from the permanent, the superficial from the substantial, the 
caused from the causing in the phenomenon. This phenomenological difference 
between speakers—those who can and those who cannot make essential distinc-
tions—is important in many human situations, and it proves the continued signifi-
cance of the distinction between essences and incidentals. (One of the marks of 
Sokolowski’s phenomenological style is to mine a discussion from the classical 
tradition, but then to adjust it and extend it using the resources of phenomenology. 
In this case, Sokolowski is adapting Aristotle’s discussion of the predicables from 
Topics and of substance from Metaphysics, though he does so in a way, characteris-
tic of him, that is informed by the scholastic tradition and by the need to reframe and 
correct the premodern presentation in light of modern developments and 
objections.)





Three further books—The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian 
Theology (1982), Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure 
(1994), and Christian Faith and Human Understanding: Studies on the Eucharist, 
Trinity, and the Human Person (2006)—develop a “theology of disclosure” that is 
phenomenological, Sokolowski says, because it “bring[s] out the integrity of what 
[it] examines” and “examines the manifestation of things believed in Christian 
faith”.16 Crucial to Sokolowski’s philosophy of God is an emphasis on “the Christian 
distinction”—a distinction between God and the world. The claim is that the divine 
is not part of the world, as paganism would have it, but is beyond the world and not 
dependent upon the world; God would no less be without the world, and with God 
there would be no less good if the world were not.
These works show his originality as a philosopher of God and a theologian, 
developing a phenomenological approach to Christian faith and the mysteries it 
confesses. His approach is at once faithful to the faith, consonant with theological 
tradition, and radical, since it shows phenomenology’s ability to add something new 
to the tradition, bringing out presentational aspects of the articles of faith “without 
submerging what is believed into subjectivity”.17 One aspect of the philosophical 
significance of these more theological works should be noted here. In putting his 
philosophical life publically at the service also of his faith, this philosopher not only 
displays his integrity as a man, but also defends the integrity of the person: for the 
complementarity of (and distinctions between) philosophical reason and faith puts 
questions to the single, whole human person who is both philosopher and believer, 
questions the person cannot avoid if he wishes honestly to be both and yet simulta-
neously one thinker.
Sokolowski’s most influential work is probably also his simplest, Introduction to 
Phenomenology (2000). Widely read and translated, this short book is lucid, accu-
rate, and deep as an entry into classical phenomenology. He serves up, simply and 
straightforwardly, the meat and potatoes of phenomenology, including the structure 
of perception, time, the self and intersubjectivity, parts and wholes, identities in 
manifolds, pictures, language, the imagination, and categorical objects. 
Simultaneously, in defending reason, our access to reality, and the integrity of the 
person as reasonable, the book also develops characteristically Sokolowskian 
themes. Gloriously lacking footnotes or endnotes, if anything, this book shows off 
its clarity, not its erudition (which is submerged for the sake of focus and brevity in 
what is a genuinely introductory text). Coming as it does from one of the world’s 
preeminent phenomenologists, this simple book is conspicuously unostentatious.
While drawing on his reflections in other books and essays (especially 
Phenomenology of the Human Person), the remainder of this essay will focus on the 
theme of the concluding chapters of Introduction to Phenomenology. There, 
Sokolowski articulates phenomenology as philosophy and situates its significance 
within the full tradition of philosophy.
16 Ibid., 305.
17 Ibid., 305.
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2  Philosophy’s Emergence Out of the Human Conversation
Taking a cue from Michael Oakeshott’s essay “The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankind”, in Phenomenology of the Human Person Sokolowski 
articulates philosophy as a reflection on the human conversation. This ‘conversa-
tion’ for Oakeshott seems to name what ‘the lifeworld’ names for phenomenolo-
gists. Oakeshott describes it as follows:
As civilized human beings, we are the inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and 
the world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation, begun in the 
primeval forests and extended and made more articulate in the course of centuries. It is a 
conversation which goes on both in public and within each of ourselves …. Indeed, it seems 
not improbable that it was the engagement in this conversation (where talk is without a 
conclusion) that gave us our present appearance, man being descended from a race of apes 
who sat in talk so long and so late that they wore out their tails. Education, properly speak-
ing, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of this conversation in which we learn to 
recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we 
acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. And it is this conversa-
tion which, in the end, gives place and character to every human activity and utterance.18
Sokolowski seems to adopt this image from Oakeshott in order to emphasize two 
things: that prephilososophical and unscientific life is saturated and structured by 
logos and that philosophy emerges after this ordinary human conversation and pre-
supposes it.
First, let us sketch Sokolowski’s account of the origin of philosophy out of the 
human conversation. Not only do we participate in the human conversation; we also 
have a prereflective awareness of ourselves doing so. When we speak, we may sig-
nal our awareness of ourselves as participants and take responsibility for our contri-
butions by using what Sokolowski calls the “declarative” use of the first person 
pronoun—as in “I think such and such”, “I suppose”, “I doubt such and such…” 
(The declarative is to be distinguished from the use of the first person pronouns in 
informatives, as in “I am more than five feet tall”.) The declarative is an inconspicu-
ous, initial expression of reflection on our own activities of apprehending the world 
as it appears to us and articulating it for others. The declarative does not only inti-
mate our own responsibility for this apprehension and articulation—the signaling 
involved in speech already does so. Rather, by way of the declarative, the speaker 
announces ownership of his own activity as (what Sokolowski calls) datives and 
agents of truth, appropriating this activity before others.
In a further move beyond the declarative, we engage also in propositional reflec-
tion. Propositional reflection occurs when we consider a claim not naively, not in 
passive assumption, but in quotation marks, as proffered by a speaker who is respon-
sible for the claim. A neighbor may tell me, for example, that he attended Harvard. 
In normal conversation, without any clues hinting otherwise, I would take this as 
simply true. It may happen, however, that clues do present themselves: I wonder 
18 Oakeshott, Michael. 1991. “The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind”. In Rationalism 




how he could have done so given that he does not seem terribly intelligent, or per-
haps I have begun to suspect him of habitually telling self-flattering tall tales. If 
clues motivating doubt are there, I suspend judgment in the truth of the claim. The 
claim is left there hanging, as something to be verified or confirmed but not simply 
accepted. The claim has been made into a proposition, something merely proposed. 
It is not a fact, but a fact as supposed.
It is not the case that the proposition is an entity that exists prior to our move into 
the propositional attitude, as though the sentence were the proposition with assent 
added to it. In considering a proposition, “we do not subtract or withhold assent, we 
annul it. Turning a fact into a proposition is a positive achievement, a modification, 
not the removal of an element”.19 Sokolowski emphasizes that, in this way, phenom-
enology can account for the origin and being of propositions arising from normal 
human conversation: there is no need for a separated realm of logical entities. “This 
[would be] the typical philosophical mistake of making an independent thing out of 
something that is a moment dependent on something else”, he explains.20 In fact, the 
proposition is dependent upon our turn toward it; it arises in our shift into the propo-
sitional attitude.
Once we have, through normal childhood learning, acquired the ability to propo-
sitionalize claims, we may develop the ability to do so at will, without the need for 
motivating clues. Some people are more dexterous with propositional reflection 
than others, and human beings can habitualize this attitude in what is often called 
‘critical thinking.’ Sokolowski remarks on the human significance of this ability and 
its failures:
There are two extremes in the attitude people have to what is said. Some listeners are gull-
ible and go along with every report and registration they hear. For them, speech is compel-
ling… At the other extreme there are persons who have become so critical or so suspicious 
that they hardly ever go along with a report or registration. They trip up almost any remark, 
even those that are meant to be casual and uncontroversial, the harmless statements that 
keep human contact and sympathy alive.21
Though skill at propositional reflection is a virtue, and an important human achieve-
ment, this habit can also be distorted, undermining the person’s ability to engage in 
conversation in a friendly way. Not only does this hypertrophied critical attitude 
undermine lifewordly goods, it also is mistaken by some as philosophy. “Someone 
who can’t get out of the natural attitude can’t seem to help mistaking philosophy for 
denial or doubt. But philosophy sustains ordinary experience in a special, detached 
way. In fact, it’s the only defense the ordinary has against sophistic assault”.22
Propositional reflection enhances the declarative. Both remain within the natural, 
human conversation while giving the persons involved in them some distance from 
the predicational moves made in our common life. But the propositional goes fur-
ther. Compared to the conversational declarative, the propositional turn takes more 
19 Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, 59.
20 Ibid., 111.
21 Ibid., 111.
22 Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, 192.
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effort and is a more explicit break from default, natural acceptance of claims made 
in the human conversation.
Sokolowski emphasizes that although propositional reflection is often confused 
for philosophical reflection, they are not the same. One difference between them is 
scope. Propositional reflection is performed piecemeal on particular claims, which 
we put in quotation marks until we decide upon them. There is also a difference in 
attitude. While it is true that propositional reflection breaks with natural acceptance 
of a claim, because this is done piecemeal, these parts, though momentarily up in 
the air, maintain their trajectory toward verification or falsification.
At the beginning, we go along with whatever we hear being said. Even when we begin to 
distinguish between fact and proposal, the syntactical articulation that we must continue to 
perform while we entertain something as supposed pulls along with itself a tendency to 
assent. The rhetorical force of the syntax continues to work on us, and we must remain cool 
in resisting it. Besides intellectual expertness in distinguishing fact and fact as supposed, a 
certain emotional control is required to tolerate a proposition as only a supposition.23
The claims maintain their status as within the human conversation, and they carry a 
certain emotional impetus in us. Thus, Sokolowski tells us, “there is something 
pragmatic about propositional reflection”: the proposition is there to be decided 
upon, to be disconfirmed and thus crossed out, or to be confirmed and thus have its 
quotation marks removed.24
Rather than piecemeal, philosophical reflection is universal in scope, and rather 
than pragmatic, philosophical reflection is contemplative. Without distinguishing 
these two forms of reflection, we will “confuse philosophical analysis with concep-
tual clarification”.25
Suspending the whole instead of one or two pieces within it changes our reflec-
tion’s character from pragmatic to contemplative. To do so means that one has 
stepped outside the natural attitude of belief tout court; one has bracketed the world 
and suspended our world-belief. Phenomenologists will recognize that this is 
Sokolowski’s account of Husserl’s epochƝ.
Thus, Sokolowski explains the origin of philosophy out of the human conversa-
tion by way of the mediating steps of the declarative and its enhancement in the 
propositional attitude. With the declarative use of the first person pronoun and prop-
ositional reflection, human beings move closer to philosophy. As we move more and 
more to the margins of the human conversation, our reflection becomes more global 
rather than partial, and we gain a cool distance from the heat and pressure of the 
situations dominating our common life. We loosen ourselves from the partial and 
pragmatic concerns of the natural attitude, but our activity of philosophy remains 
“parasitic on what is achieved before it begins its explorations”.26
23 Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, 60.
24 Sokolowski, Robert. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 190.
25 Sokolowski, “Husserl as Tutor in Philosophy”, 302.




3  Philosophy’s Relation to the Human Conversation
Next, let us remark on Sokolowski’s understanding of the target of philosophy’s 
reflections. To identify the human conversation, rather than things, as the object of 
philosophical reflection might seem, from a phenomenological point of view (well 
rehearsed, as it is, in the idealism-realism debate), to suggest that Sokolowski is 
accepting that we must stay within human consciousness. But this is not right. The 
human conversation is public. It is our shared life structured by reason, by our syn-
taxes and categorialities. By articulating philosophy’s target as our shared conversa-
tion—which is essentially public and interpersonal—and not merely the activities 
of consciousness, Sokolowski gently corrects what has turned out to be a problem-
atic Husserlian manner of speaking, which can suggest a path toward an isolated 
ego.
While sometimes the epochƝ is thought of as a version of methodological solip-
sism, Sokolowski’s choice of words helps us avoid the mistaken solipsistic interpre-
tation. For Sokolowski, Husserl’s discovery of intentionality and his development of 
the transcendental reduction expose not a solitary ego, but the relational character of 
the person. Human thought has two types of relationalities that speak against the 
solipsistic interpretation of philosophy. First, human thought is characterized by a 
relationality to objects: “Thinking is not something that we do entirely on our own; 
we are allowed to think by what our thoughts are about”.27 This happens, namely, 
because of intentionality; with Husserl’s doctrine, “suddenly everything is restored, 
taken out of the grip of that Cartesian, Lockean obsession with immanence and 
privacy. Everything is there to be philosophically repossessed”.28 Second, human 
thought is characterized by a relationality to the human conversation itself and those 
other persons who have incorporated us into their conversations (intersubjectivity): 
“As human persons, we owe our rational life to those who have shared with us their 
thoughts, the way the world appeared to them”.29
To identify the human conversation as the object of philosophical reflection 
might seem, from a classical point of view, to suggest that we have decided to adopt 
the modern turn to the subject at the cost of the ancient concern for being, its sources, 
and its highest causes. But Sokolowski is careful to avoid this mistake, also. He 
describes the object of philosophical reflection as “the human conversation in its 
amplitude, with the inclusion of the things that are brought into the conversation and 
correlated with it”.30 That is, in philosophy we focus for reflection on our own activ-
ities as datives and agents of truth, but as datives and agents of truth we are involved 
with all things that appear to us, so that in philosophy we reflect also on everything 
that surfaces as topics of human conversation. Whereas Aristotle, in passing in the 
27 Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, xv.
28 Sokolowski, “Husserl as Tutor in Philosophy”, 297.
29 Sokolowski, Robert. 2008. Phenomenology of the Human Person. New  York: Cambridge 
University Press, 79.
30 Ibid., 3.
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Politics, says it is the job of philosophy “to speak the truth about each thing”, 
Sokolowski seems to suggest here a friendly amendment: the job of philosophy is to 
speak the truth about the speaking of truth about each thing. This only sounds defla-
tionary; Sokolowski maintains philosophy’s ancient comprehensive obligations to 
the whole of being, and not just our subjective activities, since these two are phe-
nomenologically correlated. “Philosophy strives to speak from a final context, a 
context beyond which there is no other… This comprehensive view includes not 
only the whole of things but also the activity of knowing things and speaking about 
them”.31 Philosophy “reflects on all things, insofar as they become phenomena and 
legomena”.32
Thus, in Sokolowski’s understanding of the epochƝ, of the move into the philo-
sophical attitude, we can take seriously the modern concern for the subject while 
avoiding solipsism and the ancient concern for being without forgetting about the 
activities of the subject. “The resources provided by phenomenology allow us, I 
believe, to transcend the difference between ancients and moderns. They offer a way 
to pursue philosophy as such, without being forced to be contemporary only at the 
price of turning away from the ancients”.33
Finally, Sokolowski remarks that, though it often goes unnoticed, philosophy is 
not on all fours with other modes of voice in this conversation, because it is inter-
ested primarily not in this or that thing or event, but in the dimension of the conver-
sation itself. Sokolowski tells us,
The human conversation is a whole; it is the human, subjective correlate of the whole of 
things. Philosophy reflects on the conversation and its objective correlates. Is philosophy 
itself not just one voice within the human conversation? It reflects on the whole, but does 
not this reflection put it somehow outside the whole? Or does it become just one part within 
the whole? This conundrum cannot be avoided. It is the perpetual burden (or amusement) 
of philosophers, and it explains why philosophy will inevitably be misunderstood as being 
psychology, ideology, rhetoric, poetry, or science. It must simply be recognized and main-
tained as a special issue within human understanding. It cannot be resolved by somehow 
detaching philosophy from the whole of things, or by reducing it to a partial science that 
would refuse to consider the whole. The human theoretic life comes to its completion in this 
perplexity, which really does not remain disturbing once it is recognized as inevitable… . It 
is simply one more thing to be formulated as best we can.34
The ambiguous position of philosophy, as both inside and outside the human 
conversation, necessarily causes confusions and public relations problems. When 
trying to articulate something essential about human discourse and the world, phi-
losophers will often be heard as just another one of the voices in the conversation 
next to other modes of discourse—practical, artistic, scientific, and disciplinary 
voices. Thus, Sokolowski says, philosophy is “balanced on the edge”35 of natural 









Philosophers require what Sokolowski calls a “rhetorical prudence” in presenting 
themselves.36
Sokolowski often emphasizes the difference between philosophical and prephi-
losophical discourse, calling the idiom of the first “transcendentalese” and that of 
the second “mundanese” (following Thomas Prufer). In engaging with each other 
philosophically, we must use the natural language given us, but this is difficult 
because the objects it names are standard things of the lifeworld; our words are not 
made for discussing the dimension of the presencing and absenting of things, which 
is philosophy’s focus. Thus, philosophy must “trope” its words in new ways, adopt-
ing analogical uses of mundane terms to describe this transcendental dimension 
(Sokolowski is here by analogy adopting and adapting the classical response to the 
“problem of divine names”). Many philosophical errors occur because of a failure 
to mind the gap between these two attitudes and modes of discourse. Without keep-
ing track of our discourse as in transcendentalese, “we cannot recognize philosophi-
cal discourse for what it is. We would keep confusing it for ordinary talk”.37
The way that philosophy has been defined here, as distinct from propositional 
reflection and as having a responsibility to reflect on the whole of being in “its 
human involvement”, portrays philosophy as a paradoxical enterprise. Let me put 
this in a pointed way. It seems to me that philosophy inherently has two features that 
pull us in opposite directions: first, the attempt at knowing the whole, omniscience; 
and, second, the need to remember the subject, the requirement for the philosophiz-
ing person to know himself as mortal with only human wisdom. This is the paradox 
that Sokolowksi (quoted above) says is ultimate and inevitable for philosophy as at 
once both inside and outside the human conversation. About the paradoxical human 
attempt to know the whole, Sokolowski explains:
The philosopher is omniscient only formally and only in principle, that is, only potentially. 
People sometimes complain that a philosopher pretends to be a know-it-all, and that he tries 
to tell everybody else what they are doing. But the complaint is unjustified. It is true, that if 
someone presents himself as a philosopher, he will not be able to recuse himself from any 
philosophical question. He is called, in his profession, to address the whole of things and to 
show how the parts differentiate themselves within the whole…. The potential omniscience 
of the philosopher is chastening, because, like Socrates, he is always aware that he does not 
know but is obliged to know.38
This tension between the human and super-human is essential to philosophizing. 
For example, when Lady Philosophy appears in Boethius’s prison cell, her eyes 
have “a more than human keenness”, and though she seems sometimes of averagely 
human height, at other times, when she stands up she seems to “pierce the very 
heavens and baffle the eyes that look upon her”.39 In a similar way, Husserl distin-
guishes between “philosophy as a historical fact at a given time and philosophy as 
36 Ibid., 221.
37 Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations, 122.
38 Sokolowski, Phenomenology of the Human Person, 321.
39 Boethius, Ancius. 1897. The Consolation of Philosophy of Boethius. Trans. H. R. James. London: 
Elliot Stock, 6.
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idea, as infinite task”.40 This task is a calling we cannot abandon (if we still aim to 
be philosophers), yet one we must recognize as beyond us. This “problematic telos 
of philosophy”, as Husserl calls it, makes it an “enigma” for those engaged in it.41 
We must remain always unsatisfied and perhaps a little guilty feeling.
Sokolowski’s friend and philosophical influence, Thomas Prufer captures the 
same paradox and explains the existential situation it creates for those who attempt 
this type of reflection on the whole:
Philosophy, perhaps more than any other human endeavor, is shadowed by the temptation 
to give itself up, and this is because the gap between its intention and achievement is so 
great. The infinite and accurate statement of being is never actual; hence the temptation to 
unarm the philosophical eros…. The philosophical life is the erotic life par excellence, and 
eros neither achieves plenty nor is it satisfied in poverty. From the point of view of ordinary 
life and of the arts and sciences, a point of view from which more can be achieved because 
less is intended, philosophy often seems presumptuous nonsense. And philosophy’s preoc-
cupation with reflection on its own act usually leads to oscillation between confessing its 
failures and renewing its pretensions.42
It seems to me that the today’s danger, the way in which philosophy is now tempted 
to “give itself up”, to escape from this oscillation between (in David Hume’s words) 
“philosophical melancholy and delirium”, is by making itself simply another one of 
the voices in the human conversation, making itself another one of the disciplines, 
another branch of partial knowledge, and then to disperse itself further into sub-
fields. By becoming piecemeal again, philosophical reflection would also give up its 
distance from the particular beings reflected upon; it would corrupt its contempla-
tive character and take on the pragmatic tone of confirming and disconfirming mun-
dane claims that appear within the human conversation, within the natural attitude.
4  Philosophy’s Recovery from Modernity
Sokolowski understands modernity as, in part, a change in philosophy’s attitude 
toward its own task. It is clear that the early modern philosophers, such as 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Bacon, and Descartes, understood themselves as making a 
radical break with philosophy as it had been done. They historicized philosophy by 
marking themselves as moderns and rejecting the relevance of previous “ancient” 
philosophy or (in Descartes’ phrase) philosophy as it was done “in the schools”. As 
Francis Slade—a friend of Sokolowski’s who influenced him especially on this 
topic—puts it, “All philosophy insofar as it is philosophy is contemporary”, but the 
historicization essential to modern philosophy “is intended to divest philosophy as 
40 Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
Translated by David Carr. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 291.
41 Husserl, Crisis, 394.
42 Prufer, Thomas. 1965. “Dasein and the Ontological Status of the Speaker of Philosophical 
Discourse”. 20th-Century Thinkers: Studies in the Work of Seventeen Modern Philosophers. Ed. 




it has been practiced of philosophical significance except as something that has to 
be overcome and replaced”. It is “a rhetorical posture, a tactic for winning an 
argument”.43 The moderns announced themselves as the new beginning, accom-
plishing a rupture with previous, obsolete philosophy.
What is the nature of this break? It begins in a new attitude toward the human 
conversation, toward what appears to human beings, toward the verifications and 
accomplishments of prephilosophical human life.
As Sokolowski explains, in both halves of modern philosophy, epistemological 
and political, “mind is to be understood as the power to rule”.44 The moderns erect 
an impersonal philosophical reason (epistemological method or rational sovereignty 
ending the state of nature) over against the human conversation, against what 
appears to human beings, the verifications and accomplishments of mundane life. 
Rather than admiring and clarifying the necessities in human veracity, moderns seek 
to replace the natural attitude, to rule it, thus becoming pragmatic—as Descartes 
announces that he is putting a practical philosophy in place of the speculative one 
he inherited. For the moderns, “the mind is not conceived as ordered toward the 
truth of things, but as governing its own activities and generating the truth through 
its own efforts. The mind is not receptive, but creative”.45 In contrast, for Sokolowski, 
“The mind is both receptive and active”.46 For phenomenology, “the human mind 
finds its end in the evidence of things”.47 Though he admits that some aspects of 
Husserl’s philosophy seem to mark Husserl as modern, phenomenology learns from 
the modern turn without remaining simply modern. “While phenomenology origi-
nates in modernity, it also takes a distance from it”.48
Phenomenologists usually focus on the epistemological half of the modern 
break, but Sokolowski emphasizes that modern political philosophy is involved, 
too, and that these two halves are related. Modern political philosophy does not look 
at the human community and its modes of rule—in which some person or group is 
always ruling another, or providing an account about why they should—as the focus 
of its contemplative understanding. Rather, modern political philosophy invents a 
new formal conceptualization of our situation in order to change the nature of the 
human political community. Sovereignty—the sovereign as impersonal, rational, 
tautologically justified rule—is modernity’s self-constructed political form. 
Sokolowski writes,
In the modern state, a new entity is created, the sovereign. The sovereign is not one group 
of people in the body politic. The sovereign is a construct, not a spontaneous human devel-
opment or a natural form of human association. It is an invention of philosophers. It is 
43 Slade, Francis. “Two Versions of Political Philosophy: Teleology and the Conceptual Genesis of 
the Modern State”. In Natural Moral Law in Contemporary Society, ed. H. Zaborowski. Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 238.
44 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 202.
45 Ibid., 201.
46 Sokolowski, Presence and Absence, 156.
47 Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, 203.
48 Ibid., 198.
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proposed as a permanent solution to the human political problem. The introduction of the 
sovereign is to put an end to the interminable human struggle, carried on by individuals and 
by groups, to rule. The concept of sovereignty is meant to rationalize human political life. 
It puts in place a structure that is impersonal, in contrast with the personalized forms of rule 
found in the ancient and medieval city.49
The state of nature for human beings is not prepolitical. It is Aristotle’s city, where 
we give reasons about who should be in charge and what the common good is. This 
is the state of nature that the Leviathan attempts to sweep away. The rational modern 
state would like to put an end to the natural, messy play of opinions. It does so with 
the philosophical idea of sovereignty, which is the political equivalent of Descartes’ 
method for discovering the truth. And the state of nature for human beings is not 
prelinguistic, either. It is Oakeshott’s “conversation of mankind” in which we enjoy 
chatting and arguing, and in which we, by sharing our minds, help each other 
develop mindfulness and allow each other to see the world better. This is the state of 
nature that modern method attempts to replace, for modern epistemology recon-
structs truth on its own terms rather than honoring the fact that even prephilosophi-
cal human beings essentially and successfully share in logos, as datives and agents 
of truth.
In this context of his understanding of modern philosophy, we see the importance 
of Sokolowski’s consistent claim, in all his major works, that philosophy remains 
always dependent and reflective on prephilosophical human life, that the world as it 
shows us prephilosophically is worthy of our engagement and its goods worthy of 
protection, and that the prephilosophical human person—despite the absences, 
vaguenesses, and mistakes coincident with human veracity—has integrity as a ratio-
nal agent, contemplatively and practically.
Of course, Sokolowski does not present phenomenology as merely rejecting 
modernity. Rather, the important point is that phenomenology allows a recovery that 
is not a mere restoration. Husserl’s breakthrough
opened up a context within which all the philosophical capital of antiquity and the middle 
ages, as well as that of modernity, can be retrieved. If we grasp the issue of presence, 
absence, difference and identity correctly, we need not abandon what went before but can 
possess it all in a new light. We need not merely repeat the past but we do not have to run 
away from it either. Addressing the issue of presence and absence is an appropriate modern 
way of raising the question of being.50
5  Conclusion
Aurel Kolnai remarks, “the future historiography of ideas … will set it down as a 
common place that with Husserl commences the non-Cartesian Age in European 
thought”.51 Phenomenology is a twentieth century movement within the history of 
49 Ibid., 199.
50 Sokolowski, “Husserl as Tutor in Philosophy”, 300–1.




philosophy. Its founder, Edmund Husserl, learned how to philosophize influenced 
primarily by late nineteenth century movements in philosophy, mathematics, psy-
chology, and the sciences. Though he read other texts from the history of philoso-
phy, his knowledge here was unsystematic, often perceptive but lacking scholarly 
care. References to these texts are not often found in his published writings. They 
are found in his lectures and appear most seriously in his final work, The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, and its associated texts, 
where, as in his lectures, the texts and thinkers referenced are primarily canonical 
pieces of modern philosophy. What comes across clearly when Husserl discusses 
texts and thinkers from thought’s past is that he views his phenomenology as an 
epoch-making breakthrough, one that both fulfills and moves beyond modern phi-
losophy and the Enlightenment.
Despite the fact that Husserl was convinced about himself that he had moved 
beyond philosophical modernity, critics and historiographers often place him less 
flatteringly as the last German idealist, as Heidegger’s preface, or as thoroughly an 
academic of his time devoted to the rationalistic project of fin de siècle science. His 
texts provide enough data for people who wish to dismiss him in these ways, and 
none of these accounts completely lack elements of truth. Each of us arrives at a 
time and place, in particular communities, and we are inducted into intellectual life 
through contemporary conversations. We are formed by our predecessors and 
judged by our successors. When we act or speak, we must act or speak on stages we 
have not set ourselves, responding to what happened just before our arrival and to 
what just happens now to be going on around us. That does not mean that when we 
act or speak we are swallowed up in these surroundings. Though all men are men of 
their time, a successful man is never merely that.
Husserl was not as prepared as one might wish to articulate what about his 
thought marked it off from his modern predecessors’. One of Robert Sokolowski’s 
great contributions is that he has done so, and he has been able to do so because he 
has a keener understanding of the history of philosophy—of philosophy’s beginning 
with the ancient Greeks, of the medieval appropriation of philosophy that sought to 
make room for natural reason within the context of revelation, and of modern phi-
losophy’s attempt at a new start, rejecting its predecessors as mere history and thus 
as philosophically irrelevant. Sokolowski situates phenomenology within this past 
of thought, and by doing so allows us to appreciate Husserl’s marvelous achieve-
ment against this backdrop. This might make it sound as though Husserl’s achieve-
ment was merely one against a backdrop, epoch-making and revolutionary, as 
though it were utterly new—yet another modern attempt at another modernity. With 
the help of Sokolowski’s reflections, we understand phenomenology both as new 
and as recovery, as epoch-making and as development, and as a development not 
only within the modern philosophy but of philosophy simply speaking. With 
Sokolowski’s Husserl, we find one path to recover philosophy.
It is easy to lose the forest of philosophy amid Husserl’s trees, to be exhausted 
just reading about his indefatigable work ethic for phenomenology’s infinite tasks, 
to grow forgetful of phenomenological philosophy within phenomenological analy-
ses. Sokolowski helps readers understand how phenomenology is truly a form of 
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philosophy in continuity with, while making a novel contribution to, a perennial 
tradition. He does so while articulating—and, better, showing by example—what 
philosophy does, transcending its ancient, medieval, or modern forms, and its con-
temporary diaspora into subfields.
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